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PUBLIC LAW

LABOR LAW
JOHN C.

WHITEHOUSE*

As in the past, this article connects chronologically with the previous
Labor Law Surveys.' In addition to Florida decisions and the activities
of the 1959 Florida Legislature, we have considered federal decisions and
NLRB action where such appear to be of local impact. 2 Developments
in the law of the individual employment contract have been reviewed
where germane to the law of labor relations generally.
STATE

v.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Labor relations, as a branch of Florida substantive law, has been
shrinking in dimensions. This is primarily due to the Leedom3 and
rapidly
Sax 4 decisions, the effect of which has been to federally preempt5 a
heretofore prolific field of Florida labor litigation, viz., that arising from

the "hotel" cases.
Due to their importance, a discussion of these decisions would appear
to be appropriate at this point.
The hotel labor disputes were discussed at some length in the two
preceding Labor Law Surveys, 6 and the reader is referred thereto7 for
any necessary background information. It will be recalled that these
*Lecturer in law, University of Miami School of Law.

1. 8 MIAMI L.Q. 246 (1954); 10 MA1H L.Q. 208 (1956); 12 U. MiAmI L. Rrv. 344
(1958).
2. The period covered by this article extends, generally speaking, from August 2,
1957 through August 1, 1959, though a few later cases have been picked up for the sake
of completeness. Specific cut-off volumes are as follows: 358 U-S.; 267 F.2d; 168 F. Supp.;
114 So.2d; 13 Fla. Supp.
3. See note 19 infra.
4. See note 16 infra.
5. See note 21 infra, and the related text.
6. 12 U. MITAmI L. REy. 344 (1958); 10 MiAmI L.Q. 208 (1956).
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disputes arose from the energetic - and vigorously resisted - efforts of the
Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Union, Local 255, to organize the
employees of the "Cold Coast" hotels. The ensuing proceedings fell into
two sharply-defined legal phases.
First, there was a series of injunction suits,8 brought in the state
courts, by the owners of the various hotels to halt organizational picketing
of their establishments. These suits were consolidated, either at trial or
on appeal, and the hotel owners were uniformly successful in securing
permanent injunctions, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida, 9 against
all picketing.
Second, the union made a concurrent effort to invoke NLRB jurisdiction
over the controversy. Notwithstanding the inherently interstate character
of the hotel industry,' it had been a long-standing policy of the NLRB
7. In particular, 10 MiAMi L.Q. 347- 348 (1956).
8. Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, 80 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1955),
with which five other cases were consolidated, subsequent opinion, 83 So.2d 11 (Fla.
1955); Sax Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, 80 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1955).
9. lotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Ilotel Dchnonico, 93 So2d 600 (Fla. 1957);
Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Boca Raton Corp., 93 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1957); Hotel
Employees' Union, AFL, v. Sea Isle Hotel, 93 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees'
Union, AFL, v. Martinique Iotel, 93 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees' Union.
AFL, v. Casa Blanca Operating Co., 93 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1957); Iotel Employees'
Union, AFL, v. Allenbcrg, 93 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1957); lHotel Employees' Union, AFL, v.
Levy. 93 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1957); ilotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. 2500 Collins Avenue
Corp., 93 So.Zd 598 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Monte Carlo,
93 So.2d 597 (lia. 1957); Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Biscayne Terrace Hotel,
93 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Cohen, 93 So.2d 596
(Pla. 1957); Hotel Employees' Union, APL v. Leevlans Corp., 93 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1957);
Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. A. 11. S. Corp., 93 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1957);
Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Stuyvesant Corp., 93 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1957);
Hotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. McAllister Hotel, 93 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1957); Hotel
Employees' Union, AFL, v. Di Lido Hotel, 93 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1957); Ilotel Employees'
Union, AFL, v, Sax Enterprises, Inc., 93 So.2d 591 (1la. 1957); Iotel Employees'
Union, AFL, %'.Lanshorgh, 93 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees' Union, APL, v.
Levy, 93 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1957); Iotel Employees' Union, AFL, v. Sorrento Hotel,
93 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1957).
10. It will be recalled that the employees' union, in briefs filed to support its
attempt to invoke NLRB jurisdiction, stated:
During the year ending September, 1954, the four county area including
Miami and southeast Florida had 2,500,000 visitors, (the greatest
number of whom were accommodated by the hotel industry) who spent
47,600,000 visitor days and $513,000,000. Of this amount, $376,000,000
was spent in Dade County (Miami-Miami Beach) alone. This represents one-third of all spending in this county. $235,000,000 was
spent in the Miami Beach area alone. This is equivalent to two and
one-half times the spending of the residents of Miami Beach.
lhe hotel industry in Miami Beach has more than 30,000 units, employs
approximately 12,000 people in all categories, and received for the year
ending September, 1954, in excess of $74,000,000 for hotel lodging
from visitors from outside the state of 1lorida. These hotels also
received in excess of $27,000,000 for food from these visitors. Thus
the hotel industry of Miami Beach received over $100,000,000 in
reveuc from tourists moving in the chain of commerce. Bureau of
Economic Research, University of Miami.
The tourist industry of Miami and Miami Beach represents the leading
industry of the area and produces more than the income of the next
two leading industries (Miami Daily News 3/16/1955 . ... In 1949,
when the tourist trade in the Creater Miami area was only $243,000,000
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to decline jurisdiction over hotel labor disputes generally." During the
Florida hotel disputes, the NLRB at each administrative level, up to and
including the full Board, persisted in its adherence to this policy. The
union thereupon filed a petition for declaratory judgment and for injunctive
relief in the United States District Court, District of Columbia,' 2 asserting
that the board had violated its rights under the National Labor Relations
Act2 3 and received another adverse ruling. On appeal, the Board's action
was again upheld by the United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit, in Hotel Employees' Local No. 255 v.Leedom, 14 Fahy, J.,
dissenting, judge Fahy's dissenting opinion, in retrospect, is of interest,
particularly the following portion:15
It seems to me to be inconsistent with the terms of section 9(c)
of the Labor Relations Act . . . for it to refuse to assume

jurisdiction over any representation case involving any hotel ....
There is no intination in the Act that the public or employees
or employers should be denied the benefits of the representation
provisions simply because a hotel is involved ...Subsequently, in each of these two phases of the hotel disputes, the
union has since emerged overwhelmingly triumphant.
As to the first phase, on consolidated writs of certiorari, the Supreme
Court of the United States struck down the Florida injunctions, Hotel
Employees' Union, Local 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc.'6 The Court forcefully

stated:

7

The Florida courts were without jurisdiction to enjoin this organizational picketing whether it was activity protected by § 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended . . . or prohibited
..
This follows even though the
by § 8(b)(4) of the Act.
.

National Labor Relations Board refused to take jurisdiction ...
as compared with $376,000,000 in1954, the income of the next leading
industry (airline operations and repairs) was only $105,000,000 and
income from all manufacturing was only $45,000,000; fruit and vegetable growing produced only $13,700,000 in total income.
In addition, the hotel industry of Miami Beach is closely allied to all
types of interstate transportation systems. During the year ending
September, 1954, the airlines alone transported over 1,200,000 tourists
to the Greater Miami area, the greatest number of these people being
destined for acconimodations in the hotels of the employer association
herein.

. . . Eastern Airlines . . . transported over 25,000 persons and
received revenue in excess of $28,000,000, National Airlines transported
in excess of 23,000 persons with revenue in excess of $25,000,000.
l)elta Airlines (received) .. .il excess of a $5,700,000 revenue ...
I1.Virgin Isles Hotel, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 558 (1954); Hotel Ass'n of St. Louis,
92 N.L.R.3. 1388 (1951); White Sulphur Springs Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1949).
12. Hotel Employees' Local No. 255 v.Leedomn, 147 V.Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1957).
13. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), asamendcd, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1958).
14. 249 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
I5.Id.at 507.

16. 358 U.S. 270 (1959).
17. Id.at 271.
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The record does not disclose violence sufficient to give the State
jurisdiction under United Auto. A. & A. I. \Vorkers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 351 US 255. . . .In none of the
twelve cases did the Florida trial courts make any finding of
violence, and in some an affirmative finding of no violence 'as
V

made....

Th1e other and seemingly more far-reaching' phase, concerning NLRB
jurisdiction over hotels generally, turned out equally well for the hotel
employees' union. After the adverse ruling of the court of appeals, the
union sought review, by certiorari, to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The high Court reversed19 the court of appeals and handed
down an opinion of unusual brevity. The opinion, quoted below in its
entirety, is as follows: 20
We believe that dismissal of the representation petition on the
sole ground of the Board's "long standing policy not to exercise
jurisdiction over the hotel industry" as a class, is contrary to
the principles expressed in Office Employes International Union,
Local No. 11 v, NLRB. . . The judgment is therefore reversed
and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings
not inconsistent herewith.
To sum up, it will be seen that, pursuant to its apparently never.

ending task of curtailing state jurisdiction through the now well-entrenched
doctrine of federal preemption,' the Supreme Court of the United States
has again turned a heretofore local matter- the Florida hotel disputesinto a subject of national control.
While understandable impatience with the slow-moving processes
of local government may very well have been an obvious precipitating
force behind the Supreme Court rulings it is submitted that such farreaching questions of federal jurisdiction should be decided squarely on
18. The resulting additional case-load imposed on the NLRB has necessitated a
substantial increase in personnel, according to local sources.
19. Hotel Employees' Local No. 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 999 (1958).
20. Id. at 100.
21. The effect of federal pre-emption has been, in many instances, to create a
so-called "no-man's-land."

This phase of pre-emption is discnssed in Footnote 35, infra,

and the related text. For background material on the theory of federal pre-emptiou,
in and of itself, the reader is referred to the following law review discussions. Browne.
The Question of Pre-emption in Labor Injunctions, 24 Mo. L. Rr.v. 166 (1959);
Reynolds, Federal Pre-emption and the Twilight Zone in Labor Disputes, 27 J. B. Ass'N
KAN. 157 (1958); Van .dc Water and Petrowitz, lederalState Jurisdiction and the
Constitutional Framework in Industrial Relations, 31 So. CAz.. L. REV. I11 (1958); Knee,
Federal Supremacy in Labor-Management Relations, 27 FosnnlA-m L. REv. 373 (1958);

Nanet, Federal Pre-emption, Free Speech and Right-to-Work Statutes, 52 Nw. U. L. REv.
143 (1957); Turnbnll, Federal-State Jurisdictional Problems, 7 LAII. L. J. 5 (1956);
Glushien, Federal Pre-emption and Labor Relations, 15 Fi.u. B. J. 4 (1955); Comment,
Federal Limitations on State Jurisdiction over Labor-Management Relations, 12 ARK.
L. REv. 354 (1958); Comment, Federal Pr-emption-A Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv.
691 (1958); Comment, Labor Law-Interstate Commerce- Pre-emption, 7 KAN. L.
REv. 185 (1958); Note, Federal Pre-emption and Labor Disputes, 33 ST. JOHN's L. Riv,
78 (1958).
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unshakeable constitutional grounds rather than on the pressures and
expediency of the moment.
FLORIDA DECISIONS

Albury v. Plumbers Local Union No. 51922 aptly illustrates the
28
propriety of the recent - if tardily-enacted - federal Labor Reform Act,
and the vicious result which can ensue in the absence of either appropriate
federal control of certain labor practices or similar control at the state
level. Even worse, as in the instant case, is a judicial indisposition to
recognize clearly unlawful labor practices (on the part of both management
and labor) and to meet the resulting legal issues squarely and without
prevarication.
According to the allegations of his complaint, as excerpted in the
court's opinion (which allegations nowhere appear to be disputed), the
plaintiff, Albury, a non-union plumbing contractor, entered into an agreement with a general contractor, Porter-Wagor-Russell, Inc. to supply certain
plumbing for the latter's housing project. Soon after Albury had begun
work he received a letter from the general contractor informing him that
the plumber's union (whose men were also working on part of the
project) objected to the use of any non-union labor on the job, and that
if Albury did not use union labor after a stated deadline, his contract
would be terminated.
The contract between Albury and Porter-Wagor-Russell was in writing
and contained no requirement that only union labor could be used in
performing the work.
Albury thereupon filed his suit for injunctive relief against the union,
the general contractor, and various other contractors, alleging a conspiracy
among these defendants to prevent him from performing under his
contract, and to force his employees to either join the union or lose their
employment; further, that Porter-Wagor-Russell was intimidated into sending the letter to Alburv, and that various work stoppages by union
employees of other subcontractors had been made so as to prevent Albury's
men from working.
The lower court denied the temporary injunction and dismissed all
of the defendants except Porter-Wagor-Russell. Albury thereupon took an
interlocutory appeal.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in a somewhat disappointing opinion (for reasons to be further elaborated), affirmed the
chancellor's ruling on each of the points presented.

22. 100 So.2d 647 (Fla. App. 1958).
23. S. 1555, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959).
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As to the denial of the temporary injunction, the court applied the
oft-invoked rule2 4 that such 25 matters are within the discretion of the
chancellor. The court stated:
In considering the application for temporary injunctive relief
against the appellee, Porter-\Vagor-Russell, Inc., the chancellor
below was called upon to exercise his discretion in determining
whether or not the allegations of the complaint were such as to
warrant the issuance of the writ.

This ruling, it should be noted, was in spite of the fact that the allegations
of the complaint do not appear to be anywhere in dispute.
As to the second point concerning the dismissal of the five other
defendants, the court stated that injunctive relief against the alleged conspiracy was not proper since Albury "has a remedy at law" 25 and could
prosecute the offending parties under Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. The
court failed to cite any specific section of Chapter 447. However, it
appears that the only criminal provision in that chapter is § 447.14
which provides:
Penalties. Any person or labor organization who shall violate
any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction thereof,
be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not to exceed six months, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
The court goes on to cite three cases 27 to bolster its position, an examination
of which shows that they have naught in common save dicta to the effect
that "equity will not enjoin a crime."
An evaluation of the Albtiry decision fairly compels one to the
conclusion that it is, indeed, an unfortunate one. Is it not a mockery of
Florida's "right-to-work law "'s when workers, such as Albury's, may be
subjected to court-sanctioned coercion of the type practiced here? Is it
properly within the province of an appellate court to label as "discretionary"
the denial of an injunction by the chancellor below when the record
shows no disputed facts, and when such facts so clearly call for injunctive
29
relief?
24. The Florida cases so holding are numerous indeed. A few leading examples
are Stirling Music Co. v. Feilbach, 100 So.2d 75 (Fla. App. 1958); Watson v. Cochraine,
150 Fla. 733, 8 So.2d 664 (1942); Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140
So. 328 (1932); Suwannce & S. P. R. Co. v. West Coast Ry. Co., 50 Fla. 609, 39 So. 538
(1905); Swepson v. Call, 13 Fla. 337 (1869).
25. 100 So.2d at 648.
26. Id. at 649.
27. Polk v. Polk, 41 So.2d 150 (Mla. 1949); Lansky v. State ex rel.
Gibbs, 143
Fla. 301, 199 So. 46 (1940); Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Bryan, 93
Fla. 415, I'l So. 801 (1927).
28.FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights § 12.
29. There can he no question that the allegations, if proved, would constitute
unlawful conduct, namely, conspiracy and secondary boycott activities. It is, of course,
well-established that, even if the matter were one concerning or affecting interstate
commerce, neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act nor the National Labor Relations Act

19591

LABOR LAW

Moreover, it is a well-established principle of Florida law that, while
equity will not enjoin a crime,' 0 the mere fact that an act is a crime will
not per se preclude equitable relief.3 ' And it is an equally well-established
principle that an injunction will lic to rcstrain third persons from such
interference with the performance of a contract. 32

It is submitted that the Albury situation would not long be tolerated
were the matter before a federal forum - ordinarily regarded as far more
hospitable to labor than are state courts.33
Finally, it should be noted that the court's suggested recourse to
the criminal provisions of Chapter 447 would surely prove of little
benefit to the plaintiff in view of the severe drubbing this chapter received
when constitutionally construed by the Supreme Court of the United
34
States.
One of the two Florida cases illustrating the so-called "no-man's land"'8
where neither federal nor state jurisdiction may be invoked (a subject of
would deprive a state court of its power to issue injunctions against such unlawful
conduct. See Mayer Bros. Poultry Farm v. Meltzer, 247 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1948) Southern Bus Lines v. Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 295
Miss. 354. 18 So.2d 765 (1945).
30. This seems to be a fairly general rule in most jurisdictions. See MecGuire v.
Amcrin, 101 F. Supp. 414 (1951); Knighton v.Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 41 So.2d 172
(1949); Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297,
appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 851 (1948); Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. Glisan,
230 S.V.2d 169 (Mo. App. 1950).
31. It is ironic to note that in two of the three cases cited by the court, namely the
Pompano Horse case and the Lansky case, the activities enjoined were criminal and that
the issuance of such injunction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in both
instances.
As a matter of fact, the number of cases which hold that criminal activities will
not preclude an injonction are so numerous that little purpose would be served in
attempting to list them here. A concise summation may be found in 28 Am. Jun.,
lr',unctions, § 157 (1959) wherein it is stated:
the mere fact that an act sought to be enjoined is punishable
under criminal laws will not preclude either the state or an individual
from evoking the jurisdiction of equity for the purpose of securing an
injunction whenever other facts afford a basis for the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction on recognized grounds."
32. See the clear-cut decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida in Dade Enterprises v. \Vometco Theatres, 119 Ha. 170, 160 So. 209 (1935) and Anderson v.
Tower Amusement Co., 118 Fla. 437, 159 So. 82 (1935), vacated (due to changed
circumstances), 118 Fla. 895. 160 So. 523 (1935).
33. Witness the energetic efforts of the Hotel Employees' Union to invoke
NLRB jurisdiction (with its right of recourse to the federal courts) over Florida's
hotels.
34. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), reversing [Jill v. State, 155 Fla. 245,
19 So.2d 857 (1944).
35. See Petro, Federal Pre-emption-A Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 691 (1958);
Bernstein, Complement or Conflict: Federal State Jurisdiction in Labor-Management
Relations, 3 How. L. J. 191 (1957); Shenkin. State Power Where N.L.R.B. Refuses
to Assert Jurisdiction, 8 LAB. L. J. 155 (1957); Tobriner and Grodin, Taft-Hartley
Pre-emption in the Area of NL.R.B. in Action, 44 CALIF. L. Rzv. 663 (1956);
Comment, Pre-emption and Non-Regulation-the "No-Man's-Land" of Labor Relations, 18 MD. L. Rrv. 50 (1958); Note, 2 VILL. L. REv. 570 (1957); Note, 56
Micn. L. Rxv. 133 (1957); Note, 1957 UNIv. OFl ILL. L.F. 145 (1957); Note,
45 CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1957); Note, 104 U. PA. L. Rev. 1001 (1956); Note, 65 YALE

L, J. 86 (1955).
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recent corrective federal legislation) 361 is Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America v. Donald S. La Vigne, Inc."7
The litigation began as an injunction suit against picketing of the
employer's premises. The lower court entered a temporary injunction, denied
the defendant union's motion to dismiss the complaint and an interlocutory
appeal was taken by the union.
Prior to the institution of these proceedings, the employer had
requested the National Labor Relations Board to conduct a certification
election, but for some reason, which is not apparent from the opinion,
the Board did not act and the employer thereupon filed his injunction suit.
The crux of the matter was concisely stated by the Court:38
The primary question raised on this appeal is whether or not,
under these circumstances, a state court has jurisdiction to enjoin
peaceful and non-mass picketing designed to require the employer
to recognize the union as the bargaining representative, where the
employer is admittedly engaged in interstate commerce. We conclude that the question should be answered in the negative.
[Emphasis added.]
The remainder of the opinion is devoted to a review of the authorities
pro and con, and there seems little question as to the correctness of this
decision under the then existing state of the law. The Supreme Court
of the United States bluntly recognized the existence of this "no-man's
40
land" in Cuss v. Utah L.R.B.39 wherein the Court said:

We are told by appellee that to deny the state jurisdiction here
will create a vast no-man's-land, subject to regulation by no agency
or court. . . We believe, however, that Congress has expressed

its judgment in favor of uniformity. Since Congress' power in
the area of commerce among the States is plenary, its judgment
must be respected whatever policy objections there may be to
creation of a no-man's-land.

A vigorously contested labor dispute which precipitated such a wealth
of collateral legal issues and sub-issues that the principal matters at issue
were initially buried is Internationzal Hod Carriers Union v. Heftier Construction Conpany.4' Eventually the case emerged as yet another Florida
"no-man's land" decision.
The dispute arose at one of the contractor's housing projects. The

contractor sought injunctive relief alleging that the union was conducting
an illegal strike and boycott against the project to force the contractor
not to do business with a non-union supplier of concrete.
36. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1959).
37. 111 So.2d 462 (Fla. App. 1958).
38. Id. at 463.

39. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
40. Id. at 10.

41. 112 Sold 848 (Fla. 1959).
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The lower court, after a hearing and the disposition of various
preliminary motions, entered a temporary injunction against the union's
42
activities which injunction was upheld on interlocutory appeal.
Issues were then joined as to the principal matters in controversy.
The union contended, among other things, that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction of the dispute in that the matter was wholly within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board due to the interstate
nature of the contractor's business. This jurisdictional question quickly
became the main bone of contention, voluminous documentary evidence
being tendered by the union in support of its position.
The lower court concluded that the contractor was not engaged in
interstate commerce, and entered a final decree, permanently enjoining
the union from striking or boycotting the project. The court further
ruled that the contractor was entitled to recover compensatory and
exemplary damages from the union. The union thereupon appealed directly
to the Supreme Court of Florida.
It was at this point that the fat really went into the fire as to any
judicial determination of the principles of labor law basically at issue,
since a serious jurisdictional question immediately arose. That is to say,
should the union have appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Florida
or should it have, instead; sought review by the appropriate district court
of appeal?
It was the union's position, in taking the direct appeal, that the
Supreme Court of Florida had jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 2.1 (a) (5) (a),
Florida Appellate Rules, which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from:
. . . final judgments or decrees passing directly upon the validity
of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or construing a
controlling provision of the Florida or Federal Constitution ...
The Supreme Court, in a carefully written opinion, reviewed the
applicable law at some length, and conveniently set forth the four
procedural prerequisites4 3 for review by the Supreme Court of Florida

42. International Hod Carriers Union v. Heftler Constr. Co., 103 So,2d 884
(Fla. App. 1958).
43. These are:
1. The constitutional question must have been raised at the first
opportunity,

2. The constitutional provision claimed to have been violated must
have been designated specifically either by explicit reference to the
article and section or by quotation of the provision.
3. The facts showing the violation must have been stated, and
4. The constitutional question must have been preserved throughout
for review. This requirement contemplates adequate coverage of the

constitutional question in the appellate briefs.
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under the above-quoted section. The essence of the court's opinion is
tersely summed up as follows: 44
By his final decree the chancellor held the appellee was not
engaged in interstate commerce and that there was no showing
that the appellee or the strike or boycott had any impact or
cffect upon interstate commerce. This finding of fact rendered it
unnecessary for the chancellor to construe or interpret a constitutional provision. (Emphasis added.)
The inevitable conclusion, of course, was that the Supreme Court
was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and that it must be
remanded to the District Court of Appeal, Third District.
As this article goes to press, the district court's decision has just
4
come down. "
The principal point involved on the appeal again concerned whether
or not Heftler's activities were such as to affect interstate commerce. The
lower courf ruled that they were not. This finding was reversed by the
Third District on the grounds that the contractor purchased some
$302,000.00 worth of out-of-state goods for its project and that, in the
46
words of the court:
These purchases cannot be characterized as so trifling that the
doctrine di minimus non curat lex applies..
It is significant that the court recognized, in its opinion,4 7 that as
far as the National Labor Relations Board is concerned, a minimum of
$500,000.00 of out-of-state purchases by the employer are required before
it will entertain jurisdiction.
Possibly the La Vigne and the Heftier cases will reappear after the
new Labor Reform Act 48 becomes effective. 49
National Airlines, Inc. v. Metcalf o presents an unusual Florida interpretation of the Railway Labor Act 1 as it applies to airlines and their
employees. National Airlines, by whom Metcalf was employed, had entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the Airline Agents Association
International, in which it was provided that grievances would be referred
to a "System Board of Adjustment." Such a board is composed of labor
and management representatives, and is sanctioned by specific provisions
2
of the Railway Labor Act.
44. 112 So.2d at 852.
45. International Hod Carriers Union v. Heftier Constr. Co., #59-356, District Court
of Appeal, Third District, Florida, November 9, 1959.
46. Id. at page 3.
47. Id. at page 3.
48. See note 23 supra.

49.
50.
51.
52.

The no-man's-land provisions of the Act became effective on November 13, 1959.
114 So.2d 229 (Fla. App. 1959).
44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1958).
See notes 55 and 56 infra, and the related text.
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Due to a suspension of the airline's operations during August of

1956, Metcalf was laid off for a period of ten days. Metcalf took the
position that such lay-off constituted a lockout in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement. The matter was brought before the System Board
of Adjustment which rendered an opinion and' an award of two days pay

in favor of Metcalf.
The airline thereupon brought suit in the circuit court challenging
the decision and award on various grounds. The lower court dismissed

the complaint and the airline appealed. The district court of appeal
narrowed the matters at issue to one key question:58

Does a state court have jurisdiction to review the award of an
airline system board of adjustment?

In arriving at its conclusion that the state courts do have such
jurisdiction, the court analyzed the applicable provisions of the Railway
Labor Act at some length.
First of all, it must be kept in mind that interstate airline employeemanagement relations are governed by the Railway Labor Act,5 4 rather
than by Taft-Hartley. While the two acts have much in common, their
differences in certain areas, such as in matters of mediation, are quite
profound. Section 153 of the Act, the controlling provision construed in
the Metcalf case, is divided into two sections, usually referred to as
"Section 153 First"55 and "Section 153 Second."5 60 Section 153 First
53. 114 So.2d at 231.
54. The propriety of this arrangement is questioned by the court, citing Mcfntyre.
The Railway Labor Act-A Misfit for the Airlines, 19 J. AIR L. & CoM. 274 (1952).
55. There is hereby established a Board to be known as the "National
Railroad Adjustment Board," the members of which shall be selected
within thirty days after approval of this Act (June 21, 1934), and
it is hereby provided(a) That the said Adjustment Board shall consist of thirty-six members,
eighteen of whom shall be selected by the carriers and eighteen by such
labor organizations of the employees, national in scope, as have been
or may be organized in accordance with the provisions of section 2
of this Act (§§ 151a, 152 of this title).
(b) The carriers, acting each through its boards of directors or its
receiver or an officer or officers designated for that purpose by such
board, trustee or receiver or receivers, shall prescribe the rules under
which its representatives shall be selected and shall select the representatives of the carriers on the Adjustment Board and designate the
division of which each such representative shall serve, but no carrier
or system of carriers shall have more than one representative on any
division of the Board.
56. Second. Establishment of system, group, or regional hoards by voluntary agreement. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
any individual carrier, system or group of carriers and any class or
classes of its or their employees, all acting through their representatives,
selected in accordance with the provisions of this Act, from mutually
agreeing to the establishment of system, group, or regional boards of
adjustment for the purpose of adjusting and deciding disputes of the
character specified in this section. In the event that either party to
such a system, group, or regional board of adjustment is dissatisfied
with such arrangement, it may upon ninety days' notice to the other
party elect to come under the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board.
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establishes the National Railroad Adjustment Board, a joint board composed
of members of labor and management, with distinct administrative adjustment powers conferred by the Act. 7 As a practical matter, Section 153

First has present-day application only to railroad employees.
It will be seen that Section 153 Second permits individual carriers
(railroad or airline) and their employees to establish by voluntary agreement a board with similar powers to the national board for the adjustment
of grievances. Other sections of the act 58 are framed in such a way as to
make such voluntarily-formed boards the exclusive administrative forum for
adjusting disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements between
airlines and their employees. Unlike the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, however, there is no procedure set forth for judicial review59 of the
decisions of such voluntary adjustment boards under Section 153 Second.
As far as the propriety of judicial review by state courts of such
board decisions, the court stated: 60
However, the agreement to arbitrate these disputes and be bound
by the award does not preclude a review of procedural due process
and jurisdictional limitations.
As far as the jurisdiction of the state court itself is concerned the
court made the following decisive comments: 6'
In the absence of any specific grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts to enforce awards of airlines systcm boards of adjustment,
it would appear that the federal courts lack such jurisdiction.
and

2

Although this contract was executed pursuant to federal law, the

complaint did not seek a construction of the statute but an
interpretation of the rights growing out of the contract. As such
no federal question was presented.
The court concluded by reversing the ruling of the lower court and
remanding the cause thereto for a judicial determination of the points
raised by the plaintiff.
It will be interesting to see whether further appellate proceedings ill
the Metcalf case will be sought, since an examination of the reported
decisions reveals a seemingly confused division of authority as to the
power of state courts to review,

57.
58.
59.
sections
60.
61.
62.

This is due to the exclusionary language of section 153 of the Railway Labor Act.
49 Stat. 1189 (1936), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958).
Judicial review of Board action under section 153 is implemented by the sub(p) and (q).
114 So.2d 232.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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FLORIDA

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

T1 1959 Florida Legislature was relatively quiet with respect to labor
matters.
The only noteworthy piece of legislation is the new Migrant Labor
Camp Act providing for the licensing and regulation of camps for migratory
laborers.
The act is relatively short. After defining migrant labor camps and
setting forth the procedure for their licensing, the act provides that the
State Board of Health shall: 6 3
Make, promulgate and repeal such rules and regulations as it may
determine to be necessary to protect the health and safety of
persons living in migrant labor camps ...
In other words, the board regulations rather than the act itself
forms the basis of the substantive law by which such camps will be
governed. Since these regulations do not appear anywhere in reported
64
forn, we have set forth their text in the adjoining footnote.
FLORIDA MEDIATION

AND

CONCILIATION SERVICE

It will be recalled that the 1957 legislature established a stateauthorized mediation and conciliation service. 5" This was explained and
discussed in the previous Labor Law Survey. 6 Since its inception the
service has been the subject of a significant opinion by the Attorney
General concerning the privileged nature of notices of dispute filed pursuant
to 'the Act. The opinion appears in the adjoining footnote.f 6
63. Fla. Laws, ch. 59-476 (1959),
64. Florida State Board of Health Regulations, Florida State Sanitary Code, cli. 25

Camps (1959).

65. FLA. STAT. § 448.06 (1957).
66. 12 U. MIAMI L. Riv. 366 (1958).
66a. Question:

Are notices of dispute which are filed with the Florida Mediation
and Conciliation Service in accordance with the requirements of the
National Labor Relations Act within the meaning of privileged matter
contemplated by § 4 of ch. 57-306, (§ 448.06(4), F.S.)?
Chapter 57-306, Laws of Florida, (§ 448.06, F.S.), created a voluntary mediation
and conciliation service, the object of which is "the prevention and amicable settlement
of labor problems." It was designed to provide a state mediation service to either work
alone or in conjunction with the National Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (29
U.S.C.A §§ 141 et seq). The state act is predicated upon the principle that the federal
act recognizes and sanctions cooperation with state and local mediation services. The
state law must not, however, be ineonsisteot with the provisions of the federal act
(State ex tel State Board of Mediation v. Pieg, 1951, 244 S.W.2d 75, 362 Mo. 798).
Both acts deal with an area that is evidently capable of harmonious concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction. Indeed, the labor management relations act itself admonishes
the federal service "to avoid attempting to mediate disputes which would have only a
minor effect on interstate connerce if State or other conciliation services are available
to the parties." (29 US.C.A. § 173). In the same regard the federal act, in § 10(a)
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FEDERAL DECISIONS

There appears to have been little federal activity of local interest,
other than that arising from the hotel disputes, previously discussed.
In the previous survey National Labor Relations Board v. Duval Jewelry
Co. 6 7 was discussed at some length as a case of interest concerning both
the authority of the National Labor Relations Board to issue subpoenaes
and the procedural methods of revocation of such subpoenaes.
The Durval case has since acquired added importance due to the
fact that the court of appeals decision was later reversed, on certiorari, by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
thereof, provides that the National Labor Relations Board may cede jurisdiction to a state
agency if the state agency conforms to national policy, and the state statute creating such
agency has not received a construction which is inconsistent with the provisions of the
federal act (29 U.S.C.A, § 160(a)).
Applicable to the question presented herein is the provision of the federal act to
the effect that one of the conditions precedent to the termination or modification of
a collective bargaining contract is that the party desiring such termination or modification:
Notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within 30 days
after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate
and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute
occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time

(29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d)(3)).

Although the regulations adopted by the National Labor Relations Board provide
that 'all files, reports, letters, memoranda, minutes, documents or other papers"
relating to activities of the labor-management relations act shall be privileged or
confidential, notices of dispute are exempted from such classification, and are made
available to interested parties (29 CY.R. M§ 1401.1, et seq.). Since jurisdiction of the
national or state mediation service is predicated upon the required notice of dispute,
this exemption is necessary, otherwise one of the parties to a dispute would have to
assume, without definite proof, that the other party properly filed the required notice.
The provisions of the state act which is applicable to the question presented herein
is § 4 thereof, and reads as follows:
No employee of the mediation and conciliation service, or any other
person authorized by the Governor to engage in the performance of
duties prescribed by this Act, shall be compelled to disclose to any
administrative or judicial tribunal any information relating to or
acquired front private employers, employees, or their representatives
in the course of official conciliation and mediation activities under the
provisions of this Act, nor shall any reports, minutes, written communications or other documents or copies of documents, and the
above-named employees pertaining to such private information be
subject to subpoena; and all reports, minutes, written communications,
oral conversations, other documents or copies of documents, and the
above-named employees, and any other information obtained directly
or indirectly in the performance of this service of mediation or conciliation shall be deemed privileged matter and subject to the complete
immunities thereby. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing quoted language of the state act, particularly the italicized portion,
implies a legislative determination that notices of dispute are not within the contemplation
of privileged matter. Support for such in-olication is the fact that such notices are not
matters properly within the "course of official conciliation and mediation activities" nor
are they "information obtained directly or indirectly in the performance of this service
of mediation." Further support for this inescapable conclusion are the above discussed
provisions, and policies, of the federal act, which must, of necessity, be considered in any
discussion or interpretation of the function of the state act. t 19571 Op. Atty. Gen.
057-361 (Fla. 1957).
67. 141 F.Supp. 860 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
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It will be recalled that the case arose when six subpoenaes, five of
which were subpoenaes duces tecum, the other a subpoena ad testificandum,
were issued to implement a National Labor Relations Board hearing, and
motions were then made before the Board by the subpoenaed parties to
revoke the subpoenaes. The Board declined to act on the motions prior
to a ruling as to their propriety before the hearing officer. This officer
subsequently denied the motions, but the moving parties did not then
seek review before the Board.
The Board thereupon instituted proceedings for enforcement in the
district court which quashed the subpoenaes, holding them unreasonable
and, further ruled that since the Board was not a "party," it was not
entitled to have subpoenaes issued.
On appeal to the court of appeals68 the district court was reversed
as to the subpoena ad testificandum, but was upheld, on different grounds,
as to the subpoenaes duces tecum. Specifically the court held that since
the act provides a procedure, for appeal to the Board, which was not
followed, the court action was premature. For the same reason, the court
held that the action of the hearing officer, in attempting to rule on the
propriety of the subpoenaes, was "a nullity."
Certiorari was granted " by the Supreme Court of the United States
due to a conflict between the seventh and ninth circuits.
The Court reversed 70 the judgment of the court of appeals holding
that the hearing officer was properly qualified to entertain and rule upon
motions to revoke subpoenaes. Needless to say, it was necessary for the
Court to perform a few gyrations in statutory construction to justify its
result in the face of the express wording of the applicable statutes"5 and
regulations7 2 which hardly could be more clearly to the contrary.
68. 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1957).

69. 355 U.S. 809 (1957).
70. 357 U.S. 1 (1958).
71. See 49 Stat. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1958)
portion of which reads as follows:

the pertinent

The Board or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party
to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpoenas requiring

the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any
evidence in such proceeding or investigation requested in such application . . . any district court . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue to such
person an order requiring such person to appear before the Board, its
member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or
there to give testimony touching the matter tinder investigation or in

question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be
punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

Also, 49 Stat. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161(1)

(1958):

Within five days after the service of a subpoena on any person requiring
the production of any evidence in his possession or under his control,
such person may petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall
revoke, such subpoena if in its opinion the evidence whose production
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The significant portions of the Court's opinion are as follows:

73

No matter how strict or stubborn the statutory requirement may

be, the law does not "preclude practical administrative procedure
in obtaining the aid of assistance in the department."
and

7 4

As we have seen, hearings on these representation cases "may be
conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office." Certainly preliminary rulings on subpoena questions are as much in
the purview of a hearing officer as his rulings on evidence and
the myriad of questions daily presented to him.
It is submitted that this type of reasoning might very readily be
applied to destroy virtually any statutory limitation, no matter how
meticulously phrased. Further, that while the result in the Duval decision
may be a sensible one, its achievement would seem to fall more squarely
within the function and duty of the legislature than of the judiciary.
A sequel to the Duval decision appears in a late opinion75 where the
court of appeals, pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling, remanded the
matter to the district court for enforcement of the subpoenaes "in a
manner considered by the District Court not to be unduly burdensome
or oppressive."70

is required does not relate to any matter under investigation, or any
matter in question in such proceedings, or if in its opinion such
subpoena does uot describe with sufficient particularity the evidence
whose production is required ....
72. See 29 C.F.R. § 10 2 .58(c) (1949), Applications for Subpoenas, provides:
. . . applications for subpoenas may he filed in writing by any party
with the regional director if made prior to hearing, or with the hearing
officer, if made at the hearing. Applications for subpoenas may be made
ex parte. "le regional director or the hearing officer, as the case may
be, shall forthwith grant the subpoenas requested. Any person subpoenaed, if lie does not intend to comply with the subpoena, shall,
within 5 days after the date of the service of the subpoena, petition
in writing to revoke the subpoena . . the regional director or the
hearing officer as the case may be, shall revoke the subpoena if, in his
opinion, the evidence whose prodtuction is required does not relate
to any matter under investigation in the proceedings or the subpoena
does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence whose production is required. . ..

Also, see 29 C.F.R. § 102.57(c) (1949):

73.
74.
75.
76.

Unless expressly authorized by these rules and regulations in this part,
rulings by the regional director and by the hearing officer shall not
be appealed directly to the Board except by special permission of the
Board, but shall be considered by the Board when it reviews the
entire record.
355 U.S. 7 (1957).
Id. at 8.
NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 257 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1958).
id. at 673.
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CONCLUSION

As was noted at the beginning of this article, the trend in Florida at
the present time is toward a weakening of state jurisdiction in the field
of labor law, mainly due to federal preemption.
Whether this trend will continue appears to be an open question.
While federal preemption will undoubtedly continue to "gobble up"
matters presently of local concern, the industrial growth of Florida may
very well, in the foreseeable future, generate sufficient local problems to
create an independent body of Florida labor law. The establishment of
a State Labor Board, as in other states, to assist the mediation and conciliation service may prove a constructive step.

